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A PSYCHOHISTORICAL VIEW OF MR.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
Andrew S. Watson*
THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER. By H.N. Hirsch. New
York: Basic Books. 1981. Pp. x, 253. $14.95.

When the reader 'closes this modest book, the personality of the
late Justice Felix Frankfurter no longer seems enigmatic. Using extensively published correspondence, articles, lectures, and judicial
opinions, H. N. Hirsch takes us through Frankfurter's life in sufficient detail to support solidly several major theses about the Justice's
motivations and behavior. Although the details and references are
parsimonious, they are sufficient to make out a good case. Hirsch's
thesis is that Frankfurter was driven by deep psychological conflicts
related to his concern about being accepted by the "Brahmin" social
elite of Washington and Boston-Cambridge, even as he tried to
please his Jewish family, especially his mother. As he struggled to
develop an identity consonant with these conflicting social images,
he made neurotic adaptations which themselves hampered his ability
to achieve his much sought-after goals.
Although Hirsch calls this book "an interpretative biography," it
belongs to the new genre of "psychohistory," for in addition to using
historical. materials, Hirsch uses psychological theory to interpret
them. It is this aspect that will probably stimulate the major challenges to the book.
In the past, professional historians and biographers have zealously attempted to rely primarily on "objective materials," which
they would set down and allow to speak for themselves. They believed that this was the best way to avoid the distortions of their own
subjective views. With the passage of time, more and more scholars,
even in the "hard sciences," have come to acknowledge that it is impossible to eliminate the subjectivity of the observer. The only way
to minimize or eliminate this kind of distortion is to develop a cognitive awareness of one's own systematic biases.
Similarly, it is assumed that the actors on the historical stage
have their own well-organized psychological distortions. Hirsch argues that an analysis of these distortions can lead to a deeper understanding of their activities:
• Professor of Law, Professor of Psychiatry (Ret.), University of Michigan. B.S. 1942,
University of Michigan; M.D. 1950, M.S. in Med. 1954, Temple University. - Ed.
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The central hypothesis of this study is that Frankfurter can only be
understood politically if we understand him psychologically, and that
we can understand him psychologically as representing a textbook case
of a neurotic personality: someone whose self-image is overblown and
yet, at the same time, essential to his sense of well-being. Because of
delays and difficulties in psychological maturation - because for several crucial years he could not decide who and what he was and thus
suffered from severe self-doubt - Frankfurter, I will argue, was led to
develop a compensating, "idealized" self-image in which he exaggerated his political skills and talents. His political style, which he applied
throughout his life, resulted from that self-image; it emphasized what
he perceived as his ability to handle other people. [P. 5.]

Hirsch explores the "factual information" about Frankfurter from
the standpoint of two explicit psychological propositions: (1) the diagnostic category of the "neurotic personality," and (2) the "self-image," or what the author comes to call "identity." Hirsch also makes
the implicit presumption, drawn from the theories of psychohistory,
that all of an individual's behavior will reflect his psychological
adaptive patterns in interplay with the several or many contexts in
which he lives. In this Review, I would like to examine these propositions to see how Hirsch uses them in reaching his understanding
of Frankfurter.
The principal progenitor of psychohistory as such is Erik Erikson. Erikson, one of the most elegant contemporary psychoanalytical theorists, set forth his main ideas about psychological
development in Childhood and Society . 1 The book presents a short
psychohistory of Adolph Hitler and uses it to show how a personality
is developed. 2 Later, in "The Problem of Ego Identity," he further
developed the concept of identity, using a psychohistorical sketch of
George Bernard Shaw. 3 Soon thereafter he completed his first major
psychohistorical work - a psychobiography on the life of Martin
Luther.4 This meticulously researched p~ychohistory became a
model of sorts and was followed by the psychohistorical analysis of
the early life of Mahatma Gandhi.5 These books demonstrate that
for psychohistory to be effective, the traditional historical research
must be done meticulously and all of the established and verifiable
information about the subject must be used accurately before the
analysis of personality is begun.
Careless research can ruin otherwise competent work. In 1966,
William Bullitt published a psychohistorical study of Woodrow Wil1. E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963).
2. Id at 326-58.
3. Erikson, The Problem of Ego Identity, 1 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC AsSN. 5 (1956).
4. E. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER (1958).
5. E. ERIKSON, GANDHI'S TRUTH (1969).
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son that he had written in collaboration with Sigmund Freud. 6 The
historical research in this book has been heavily criticized and has
provided an excellent basis for the argument that psychohistory is a
frivolous and sloppy variety of scholarship. This viewpoint has been
enhanced by the publication of Fawn Brodie's psychohistory of
Thomas Jefferson.7 Most experts on Jefferson seem to agree that she
ignored much historical material and greatly distorted other data in
her effort to prove psychologically that Jefferson had sired a number
of children by his slave, Sally Hemings. 8
The psychohistorian must overcome still mere difficulties. In a
recent article, Henry Ebel argues that a historian's choice of a subject
for study depends in part on his own psychological adaption, which
can influence not only his personal life, but also the "objectivity" of
his work. 9 The work of Ebel's group stirs controversy among professional historians because it suggests the need for self-analysis and
self-evaluation, activities that elicit anxiety in most people. (In assaying the psychological objectivity of Hirsch, I must stand mute, for I
know nothing of his psychological experience or training.)
Finally, the data for a psychohistory are often difficult to collect.
Although it has long been my aspiration to do some psychological
analysis of judicial decision-making, the data needed to do it adequately are not readily available. I therefore found Hirsch's study
especially interesting because it contains a lot of the kind of information required to understand the psychological processes of someone
who cannot be interviewed contemporaneously. While personal letters and the video-taped interviews from the Columbia Oral History
Collection are a valuable source of information (and the author
made good use of these and similar materials), they have all of the
limitations that are imposed on an archaeologist who must reconstruct a forgotten culture from the fragments of ancient artifacts.
The important material not ordinarily available in most written
records involves the emotional qualities and attributes of the person.
Evidence about emotions does not totally escape the printed page,
but more often than not it is heavily camouflaged. Inference-drawing
about the subject's emotions is fraught with difficulties and risks. Indeed, such an interpretive process inevitably arouses skepticism in
most readers. A psychobiographer or a psychohistorian nevertheless
p.as no alternative but to do it if he wishes to explore this vital aspect
of his subject's behavior.
6, S. FREUD & W. BULLITI, THOMAS WOODROW WILSON (1967),
7. F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON (1974).
8. The historical material in this book was attacked devastatingly by Virginius Dabney in
THE JEFFERSON SCANDALS (1981), and his analysis was supported by the preeminent Jefferson
scholar, Dumas Malone, in 6 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 514 (1981).
9. Ebel, The Psychohistory ofHistory: A Symposium, 3 J. PSYCHOHIST. 259 (1981),
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Hirsch does undertake this exploration, and in doing so makes
important use of the theories of Karen Homey 10 and Erik Erikson. 11
But Hirsch makes one mistake that frequently occurs when there is
expert psychiatric testimony in the trial of a legal case. He invokes
Hamey's diagnosis of "neurotic personality" for Frankfurter and
then proceeds to deduce that because Frankfurter "had" this diagnosis, he will or will not be able to perform certain types of behavior. It
is like saying ~hat persons who are "schizophrenic" will manifest
"psychotic thinking." Ipso facto, any thinking that such a person
does will be psychotic and irrational. This is simply not the case.
While certain of a schizophrenic's thought processes may be psychotic, not all will be so. Instead of deducing certain things from the
label, it is more appr9priate if the particular thought process or activity is examined specifically in relation to the individual's capacity
to carry it out. The information that would be used to arrive at a
"diagnosis" should be used directly to make a descriptive judgment
only about the behavior in question. It would have been more appropriate, in short, if Hirsch had avoided concern about whether
Justice Frankfurter had a neurotic personality. Hirsch should have
confined his examination to Frankfurter's manifest behavior as it related to his psychological capacities and disabilities.
The second concept that Hirsch uses extensively relates to the
development of a sense of identity. Erikson states:
The final identity, then, as fixed at the end of adolescence is superordinated to any single identification with individuals of the past: it
includes all significant identifications, but it also alters them in order to
make a unique and a reasonably coherent whole of them. 12

We may see from this definition that the instrumental effect of identity upon personality is to provide an individual with a kind of organizing principle from which to make a multitude of personal
decisions. Identity does not spring suddenly into being (nor does
Hirsch say that it does). Rather, it is a process that takes ongoing
experiences and slowly works them into the image of ''who I am."
Neither is the image necessarily totally integrated and consistent.
Erikson visualizes these stages of personality development as
processes that are hardly ever perfectly completed. Certain pieces of
personality and behavior may be kept apart from each other, remain
unintegrated, and even be inconsistent with each other throughout
the identity-forming process. He calls this condition "role confusion."13 Thus, an individual leaving his adolescence may be closer
to one end or the other of the spectrum between identity and role
10.
11.
12.
13.

See K. HORNEY, NEUROSIS AND HUMAN GROWTH (1950).
See E. ERIKSON, supra note l; Erikson, supra note 3.
E. ERIKSON, supra note 4, at 68.
E. ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 261.
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confusion. I will note below some of the ways in which Frankfurter
failed to bring various parts of his self-image together into a consistent identity, and that failure will help us to understand some of his
adult behavior.
A psychological process that Hirsch frequently confuses with the
concept of identity is that of "identification." Identification occurs
when an individual unconsciously sees himself to be like another,
and in so doing emulates and incorporates the behavior of the other
into his own personality. 14 It is from these identifications that part of
an identity is built up.
Frankfurter made three powerful identifications during his
young adulthood. They were with Henry Stimson, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Justice Louis Brandeis. ¥any strands of
his character and identity can be directly traced to them: he revered
and then emulated them. Unfortunately, he did not always use their
skills in the same contexts in which he had observed them, so they
did not always work for him. Additionally, when he later rose to
positions of power and importance, he expected those who became
his "followers" to act as unchallengingly as he had done with his
own models. When he came to the Supreme Court, he expected his
brothers to follow and take his professorial direction and advice,
much as his students had done. He often prefaced his advice with
comments like, "Long years of observation of the work of this Court
before I came down here . . ." (p. 159). They demurred, and resented him.
As Hirsch elaborates upon his description of Frankfurter's personality, he relies on a developmental mode of psychology. Each
phase in Frankfurter's life then becomes important in shaping his
personality. Hirsch assumes that if we can once understand and define certain behavior patterns, subsequent actions or inactions will be
comprehensible even when they appear contradictory. This approach follows the "psychodynamic" model of personality development, and most of his theoretical references are from that source.
Hirsch sees two principal factors as critical to Frankfurter's psychological development. First, he notes the importance of his background in the German Jewish immigrant community of Brooklyn
with its emphasis on upward social mobility and on the importance
of intellectual and cultural interests. The second important factor on
which much of Frankfurter's adaptive activity was centered was his
small physical stature. He was early and continuously preoccupied
with his condition as a "little guy," and Hirsch vividly describes how
he related to anyone he regarded as important or powerful. In the
early stages of a relationship with someone important, he would un14. See F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 13537 (1966).
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abashedly shower the person with flattery. If the person then failed
to respond with acceptance or approval, he soon became the object
of intense anger and bitterness.
Throughout his career and especially during the Court years,
Frankfurter was prone to be critical of his colleagues for doing the
very things that were so much a part of his own adaptive repertoire
as he tried to manipulate situations and people. In terms of egopsychology, such behaviors represent a kind of subservience and acquiescence to the perceived power and status of the person being
flattered. (With the flatterer there is also an incipient fear and an
imagined exaggeration of the other person's dangerousness.) Those
with this kind of outlook tend to divide the world starkly into two
groups - the powerful, omnipotent, and omniscient on one hand,
and the helpless potential victims on the other. This dynamic is
largely unconscious and therefore goes unapprehended by the person doing it, but "bootlickers" (a term that Frankfurter used frequently) (p. 25) always hate themselves for being subservient. This
hatred is frequently redirected toward the object of the flattery.
Thus when Frankfurter was in the submissive and flattering mode,
he could see himself in full agreement with and as a true disciple of
the powerful person with whom he was relating. At the opposite end
of the spectrum, when he was in his assertive, professorial, expert
posture, he could graciously "nurse" people along and feel good
about himself so long as they accepted his nurture in the form he gave
it. Let the person he sought to feed refuse to suckle or dare to regurgitate unbidden, and Frankfurter would become extremely angry
with him, probably without much awareness of why he was shifting
his ground. This inclination was so powerful, as Hirsch well describes it, that it sometimes made Frankfurter assume contradictory
positions that greatly puzzled those who watched him. His "scientific" liberalness thus could shift easily into truculent, obstinate
conservatism. 15
Another ·aspect of these seeming contradictions relates to why
Frankfurter changed his positions. Although he valued highly the
idea that he did everything for rational and "scientific" (!.e., external) reasons, Hirsch demonstrates clearly that many of his positions
were responses to a drummer whose beat was audible only to his
own inner and unconscious mind. Despite all of the powerful intel15. Frankfurter himself was intellectually aware of this problem. He wrote:
For those wielding ultimate power it is easy to be either wilful or wooden: wilful, in the
sense of enforcing individual views instead of speaking humbly as the voice of law by
which society presumably consents to be ruled, without too much fiction in attributing
such consent; wooden, in uncritically resting on formulas, in assuming the familiar to be
the necessary, in not realizing that any problem can be solved if only one principle is
involved but that unfortunately all controversies of importance involve if not a conflict at
least an interplay of principles.
Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror ofJustices, 105 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 781, 794 (1957).
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lectual skill that Frankfurter could muster, he, like most of us, did
not adequately understand some of the conflicting forces that operated within himself. One person who was well aware of these conflicts was his wife, Marion, who apparently tried often to get him to
be more sensitive to her emotional needs and complexities. In his
letters he occasionally and defensiveiy comments about how his selfawareness had increased and he states hopefully that Marion will be
surprised at his increasing sensitivity. However, I very much doubt
that he ever did become substantially more aware of himself, at least
in the way that he (and she) hoped for.1 6
These last comments recall to mind an interesting point made by
Arthur Koestler in The Trail ofthe .Dinosaur and Other Essays .11 He
notes that La Fontaine did not properly end his fable of "The Fox
and the Grapes." It should have been that after the fox said the
grapes were sour, all the other foxes went off to the local henhouse to
have a ball. The fox who called the grapes sour nevertheless continued to struggle to climb the tree. Night after night he returned and
repeated his attempts. One night, he actually got up into the tree
and, grabbing a large bunch of grapes, bit into them and discovered
to his dismay that they were sour. He wanted to go and tell the rest
of the foxes that the grapes were in fact sour, but he knew they
would not listen to him because foxes cannot climb trees! Rather
than turning to new trees to test other grapes, the poor fox could be
seen returning to the same tree night after night to taste the same
sour grapes. In fact, in the end he died from a perforated ulcer
caused by the sour grapes.
This is a very keen insight about human behavior. Although
human beings learn many things in the context of rationalizations, 18
the process is in many respects imperfect. A new skill is often not
useful in new and di.fferent situations simply because the person who
has acquired it cannot control it. The person is continually dragged
unwittingly back to an inappropriate and ineffective use of the skill
because a part of his memory is unconsciously attached to the context where the skill was developed (which included an erroneous assumption). It is as if the mind cannot recognize that the original
rationalization has been tested and found to be wrong, or that a new
skill has been developed that could be used in other and different
ways.
Many people are trapped exactly as the fox was, and Hirsch gives
16. P. 49. Mrs. Frankfurter notes that he is "as remote as the alps." There are similar
comments at pp. 50, 58. At p. 60, Hirsch quotes a letter to Marion in which Frankfurter says,
"[I]fyou knew what such glimpses of your own griefs, your sense ofmy inadequacy, do to me
-well you might believe that I'm learning some things." Such tensions were to exist throughout their marriage.
17. A. KOESTLER, THE TRAIL OF THE DINOSAUR AND OTHER EsSAYS 92-93 (1955).
18. See 0. ENGLISH & s. FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY 66 (1957).
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many examples of Frankfurter's being caught in such a trap. Frankfurter did develop great leadership capacity but did not always have
the power to dominate. In his several identifications with great and
powerful people, he observed that they could assert great personal
influence upon others, but he apparently did not "see" that theirs
was a persuasive and not a dominating power. Stimson, Brandeis,
and Holmes all could relate politically and personally to their colleagues even when they disagreed. This enabled their influence to
grow rather than diminish over time. Because Frankfurter did not
fully comprehend all of the psychological qualities of his models and also because of his own powerful wish to dominate and be the
"big one" among men - he, like the fox, failed to take into account
several important limitations of his growing skills.
As Hirsch discusses the concept of identity formation he tends to
imply that identity is made up largely of positive qualities from the
point of view of social values. This is not the case. It may also include negative structures that, in fact, are psychologically flawed and
therefore carry with them the omnipresent potential for failure. It
appears that in many respects Frankfurter never had a truly realistic
and accurate evaluation of his own capacities incorporated into his
identity structure. Some of his self-concepts were assertions dedicated to reassuring himself that "I am not a little guy; I'm a big,
strong, powerful individual." This smacks of the defense called "reaction formation." 19 Whenever he struck an interpersonal obstacle,
instead of being able to see it in full perspective, it was as though he
was once more confronted with his fearful little boy self. He would
literally have to destroy the obstacle to reassure himself that he was
big, competent, strong, and in control. This entailed wheeling out
his heaviest barrage of sarcasm and vitriolic characterization, which
nearly always increased the likelihood of alienation and failure. Instead of the smooth, diplomatic "manager" of things he hoped to be,
he was often isolated and ineffective. In the end, his colleagues simply tuned him out. Hirsch notes many examples of this: It takes
little imagination to see that this process of alienation must have produced a great sense of helpless impotence and despair in Frankfurter. One gathers that this same dynamic occurred between
Frankfurter and his wife, and that, too, would have fed back into his
omnipresent fear that he would not be accepted by the world at large
but rather would be relegated to the position of the rejected Jew.
Although there is clearly a shortage of material with which to
explore the early developmental stages of Frankfurter's personality,
there is a great deal of information about his adult life. Yet Hirsch
19. A reaction formation is ''the setting up of a more or less rigid attitude or character trait
which will serve as a means of preventing the emergence of a painful or undesirable attitude or
trait, usually of the opposite type." See id at 61.
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largely confines his psychological analysis to the stage of identity development that occurs during adolescence. There are other Eriksonian theoretical concepts that he might have used fruitfully. For
example, during ''young adulthood" (in terms of Erikson's "developmental stages") the ego adaptive qualities that evolve are either "intimacy" or "isolation."20 The biographical details of Frankfurter's
life provide many clear examples of difficulty across this spectrum.
Instead of developing personal relationships that moved progressively toward closeness and intimacy - relationships that reflected
deeply felt concerns about another person, such as a loving interest
in Marion's problems instead of the mere appearance of being a
good husband - he seems to have engaged almost exclusively in
more self-serving activities, such as power-brokering or appearing
paternal. According to Erikson's theory, people act this way because
of their failure to develop a solid identity, which in turn would lead
to a disinclination to take the psychological risks involved in
intimacy.
With the disabilities stemming from failure in the "adolescent"
and "young adult" stages, further developmental skewing during the
"adulthood" stage would push the ego away from "generativity" in
the direction of "stagnation."21 While Frankfurter certainly produced a great deal of work, there is at least some impression that his
ideas did not continue to develop as all had anticipated. Instead of
coming to their full growth and flower, they seem to have become
fixed and ultimately stunted, as though they had failed to receive
some vital nutrient from their surroundings. Hirsch might have
more effectively explored these aspects of Frankfurter's later development by using more of Erikson's theories. Frankfurter's failure to
develop a well articulated identity clearly did impose limitations on
his personality, but by using the materials from Frankfurter's later
years that he had at hand, Hirsch might have carried out a better and
more rounded analysis that would have deepened our understanding
about his subject.
Reading Hirsch's description of Frankfurter recalled a vivid and
very unpleasant encounter that I had with Justice Frankfurter. It
occurred when Frankfurter presented his Owen J. Roberts lecture at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School.22 In the course of a
faculty reception I was introduced to him. That encounter lives vividly in my memory as one of the most unpleasant social encounters
of my life. There was no particular reason why Justice Frankfurter
should have had any image of me whatsoever since I was a nearly
new arrival in the law school world. The only two real stimuli (un20. E. ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 263-66.
21. Id. at 266-68.
22. Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 781. This occurred on March 20, 1957.

March 1982]

Psychohistory

751

less we assume that Frankfurter was in possession of some kind of
psychic omniscience) that may have spurred a reaction in him were
(1) although I did not exactly tower over him, I was at least a head
and a half taller than he, and (2) I was introduced as a psychiatrist
(probably in those days with the faculty ')oke," "This is the faculty
psychiatrist!"). His response to me, lightning fast, was that I obviously did not warrant any kind of attention from him, and after a
brusque "How do you do," he sharply turned away from me.
Hirsch's description of how Frankfurter was strongly inclined to
make swift judgments about a person's capacities, and then treat the
person as one to be regarded with either respect or disdain (p. 43),
made me better understand how Frankfurter had behaved with me.
I also recall being struck by the fact that when he arrived, he was
accompanied by a group of younger men who obviously looked
upon him with adulation and reverence. This was in marked contrast with other Supreme Court Justices who visited our school and
whose arrivals were nearly inconspicuous. Frankfurter clearly flourished on such attention and Hirsch helps us understand how much
he needed it (p. 107).
On a second occasion I met Justice Frankfurter in Washington
when I was participating in a judicial seminar with the benches of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. My memory of that experience is not so vivid, but I do not
have any recollection of his having had any great interest in exploring the psychological subjects that the group was examining. This
was in stark contrast to many of his brothers. His lack of interest
may have been related to experiences that he had with his wife's
mental illness, for she and her psychiatrist (with whom he consulted
several times) (pp. 84-85) surely must have discussed his own behavior. It is possible that a suggestion might have been made that he
receive help in dealing with his insensitivity to her. Hirsch's account
makes it clear that Frankfurter did not have the kind of personality
that would be drawn easily toward psychotherapy. Since these encounters stand out so vividly in my memory and are still, after more
than twenty years, enmeshed in unpleasant memories, I found
Hirsch's biography interesting and helpful. It .is likely that many
others will respond similarly to this book.
It is easy to dwell on all of the things that Hirsch did not do, or to
comment on what he might have done, but this would risk giving a
very wrong impression. Hirsch goes far toward clarifying much of
the enigma about Frankfurter's behavior. It talces a large measure of
courage to write this kind of book and the author deserves our commendation for having done so. Although one may carp about some
of the psychological trails that he followed, for the most part I would
agree with his psychological conclusions. I found the book valuable
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and stimulating, and I hope that it will encourage others to go forward and use the analytic methods of psychohistory.

